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Abstract We hypothesize that the more central a firm in the customer–supplier network
the lower is its returns from an acquisition. We find that the acquirers’ announcement day
abnormal returns decline if the acquirer is more central in the network. Additionally, the
target’s premiums decline if the target is more central in the network. Lastly, we also find
that conditioned on the acquirer’s centrality, the acquirer’s announcement day abnormal
returns increase if more information is available about the target. The centrality of the firm
represents information availability of the firm. Thus, information availability may lead to a
decline in acquisition returns.
Keywords Mergers  Acquisitions  Network  Centrality  Returns
JEL Classification G34  G30
1 Introduction
The seminal work of Grossman and Hart (1980) shows that in mergers and acquisition, the
target should obtain a premium which should make the acquirer indifferent to undertaking
an acquisition. In other words the acquirer should not generate a profit or loss through an
acquisition. The subsequent literature has focused on exploring the conditions under which
the acquirer generates a profit or loss. The reasons for the acquirer’s returns range from
M. Baxamusa (&)
University of St Thomas, MCH 316, 2115 Summit Avenue, Saint Paul, MN 55436, USA
e-mail: baxa0428@stthomas.edu
S. Javaid  K. Harery
King Abdulaziz University, PO Box 80200, Jeddah 21589, Saudi Arabia
e-mail: harery3000@yahoo.com
K. Harery
e-mail: dr.saimajavaid@gmail.com
123
Rev Quant Finan Acc (2015) 44:393–423
DOI 10.1007/s11156-013-0411-7
Author's personal copy
managerial agency (e.g. empire buildings; see Jensen 1986) to behavioral reasons (e.g.
managerial hubris; Roll 1986). In this paper we put forward an explanation that is not
based on agency, hubris or synergy.
We propose that informational availability leads to a higher return in an acquisition.
Information about the other party can be employed in merger related negotiations and used
to extract the maximum benefit. For example, if the target knows about the strategic
reasons underlying the acquirer’s preference for the target. Then the target can use that
information to extract a higher premium.
The challenge here is to find an empirical proxy for the information availability of the
parties undertaking an acquisition. For example, using information asymmetry measures
like analyst coverage only allows us to partially study the informational opaqueness of
publicly available information. However, there is information that is private. This infor-
mation content is large and has a significant impact on merger outcomes. The literature
finds that the director’s social networks significantly impacts merger outcomes (Schonlau
and Singh 2009).
We study the customer–supplier networks. The rational being that customers and
suppliers have private information about the business of the firm that is valuable. Our
primary independent variable is the central position of the party in the supplier-customer
network. Information flows from one customer (or supplier) to another in the network (e.g.
we talk to you, you talk to your friend, etc.) and so the different measures of centrality like
degree and closeness are better proxies for the information availability of the central firm.
We argue that if the firm is more central in the network, then more information about it
is known giving the other party advantage in negotiations. Our hypothesis is that the more
central the acquirer; lower is the announcement day abnormal returns. Similarly, the more
central the target; the larger is the informational disadvantage the lower is the premium.
We also investigate a third hypothesis. This hypothesis deals with the information avail-
ability of the acquirer and the target. We hypothesize that conditioned on the central
position of the acquirer in the network, the returns to the acquirer increases if more
information is available about the target.
The use of industry level supplier–customer relationships to proxy for firm level rela-
tionships has a long history in the corporate finance literature (Shahrur 2005; Fan and Goel
2006). As in the literature we use the industry level Input–Output benchmark tables from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We then calculate the central position of the industry in
the customer–supplier networks. We find that the announcement day abnormal returns for
the acquirer are lower if the firm is more central. We also find that the more central targets
receive a lower premium. Consistent with our hypothesis we find that the acquirer’s returns
increase if more information is available about the target. These results are subject to a
number of robustness tests. We use different return variables. We also use an array of
centrality measures from weighted to un-weighted network centrality. We find that our
results are robust to use of different sets of controls.
In terms of literature, there is a strand that links merger outcomes to different sources of
bargaining power like direct product market relations as in A’hern (2012). This paper
contributes to the literature by empirically investigating the impact of information on
merger outcomes. This is important because it shows the channel through which private
information flows can affect bargaining in mergers. This concept of private information
affecting merger outcomes has theoretical support (Khanna 1997); however the empirical
literature has struggled to convincingly show the results because of weak proxies. This
research mitigates this weakness by using centrality measures to proxy for information
availability.
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The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and states the
hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data and constructs the variables. Section 4 presents the
results. We conclude in Sect. 5.
2 Literature review and hypothesis development
The arguments draw on network concepts that emerged in sociology during the 1970s;
most notably Granovetter (1973) on the strength of weak ties, Freeman (1979) on degree,
closeness and betweenness centrality, Burt (1980) on the structural autonomy created by
complex networks. A comprehensive review by Burt (2005) finds evidence that the social
capital of structural holes and the contradiction between network closure and structural
holes can be resolved in a more general network of social capital. Krakhard and Brass
(1994) outline how network analysis can explain six different areas, viz., turnover, attitude,
power, motivation, leadership and job design. Theoretically, actors in central network
positions are more connected and so more information about them is known. Similarly,
information about other non-central actors might be less known as they have fewer con-
nections in the network. Actors who are able to control relevant resources acquire power.
Thus, two measures of centrality, closeness (representing access) and betweenness (rep-
resenting control) corresponds to resource dependence and the degree centrality measures
the size of one’s ego network (Brass 1984; Krakhard and Brass 1994).
In this section we consider the role of bargaining in a merger. Managers who are better
informed about their counter-party’s valuation and sources of synergy should be better
positioned to negotiate a more profitable deal for their owners.
2.1 Bargaining in mergers
A typical merger process proceeds as follows. The acquirer (target) chooses a target
(acquirer) with which it wants to pursue merger discussions. After that negotiations begin.
At this point the acquirer may choose to perform due diligence of the books of the target to
estimate if some of its assumptions about the target are correct. The next step is for the
acquirer and the target’s management to meet and discuss the terms of the merger. This is
now a bargaining game in which the acquirer and the target’s management try to extract
the maximum rents for their owners. When the managers come to an agreement they
announce it to the public. If no information about the merger has leaked, then the stock
price reaction to the announcement reflects the probability that the acquisition will com-
plete and the expected benefits to the owners.
2.2 Information and bargaining
The acquirer would like to pay less for the acquisition while the target would like to get as
high a premium as possible (see Lee and Lim 2006). This division of the synergy, resulting
from the merger, happens in a series of negotiations. In a negotiation the importance of
information cannot be understated. If the acquirer has an accurate understanding of the
valuation of the target, it can price it correctly and pay accordingly. The target may not be
able to extract a larger premium as the information asymmetry between the target and the
acquirer is small. Similarly, if the target has information about the acquirer’s valuation of
the synergy, the target will demand a large fraction of the synergy (if not all of it) for their
owners.
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In a related study, Etheridge (2010) investigates whether board networks, quantified by
measures of centrality and closeness, can affect bargaining power around mergers and
acquisitions. His study finds that the board centrality is related to bargaining power; that is,
when the bidding company is substantially more central than the target both target board
approval and bid completion are more likely. In our study we consider the centrality of the
firm and not the centrality of the individual board members.
2.3 Relevant models for information asymmetry
These models in general build on the seminal work of Myers and Majluf (1984) and show
that information asymmetry between the market and the managers’ leads to the market
assuming that the managers are trying to take advantage of the markets. Summarizing the
vast stream of literature that documents these models is not possible because of space
constraint. Thus, we focus on the models that are the most relevant for this research.
One class of models (Miller 1977; Hong et al. 2006; Baxamusa 2012) predict that the
diversity of opinion about the future cash flows of the firm lead to decrease in demand for
the firm’s stocks. The implication for the acquirer is as follows. If an acquisition increases
the uncertainty about the future prospects of the acquirer, then the decrease in demand of
these stocks because of diversity of opinion will lead to a relative decline in announcement
day returns.
Officer et al. (2009) suggests that bidder returns around acquisition announcements are
driven by information asymmetry. Their result shows that using stock as a method of
payment is beneficial to an acquirer because it is the optimal contract when the target is
difficult to value. Further, their study emphasizes that under conditions that suggest that
market participants are themselves likely to face uncertainty about the prospective value of
the target to the acquirer, i.e. when the privately held firm’s financials are not known at the
time of the acquisition announcement.
Similarly, Erickson et al. (2011) investigate whether the change in the acquirer’s
information uncertainty contributes to acquirer wealth losses. Information uncertainty
affects the discount rate (the cost of capital), which in turn influences stock price. Their
results indicate that acquisitions lead to increases in information uncertainty, as proxied by
analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion, and also find that the change in information
uncertainty is negatively related to acquirer long-term stock performance, after controlling
for the acquirer’s fundamentals.
A second class of models developed in Travlos (1987) shows that the announcement of
the acquisition signals to the market that the acquirer is overvalued. Therefore, the acquirer
announcement returns for the firms with more information asymmetry will be more neg-
ative. A third class of models by P’astor and Veronesi (2006) show that uncertainty about
the firm increases its value. This is especially true when there is uncertainty about the
growth prospects of the firm. If this argument is extended then it suggests that the
uncertainty about the target increase its value and the premium it can command. Thus,
target about which there is less information available and so more uncertain is likely to
have a larger premium.
2.4 Hypotheses
The above arguments suggest that if the acquirer’s valuation and sources of synergy is
known then it leads to a decline in the acquirer’s bargaining power. This in turn reduces the
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fraction of the synergy the acquirer’s managers are able to get in a merger. Thus, the stock
market’s reaction to the announcement of the acquisition should be negative.
If an actor is more central then as a consequence it may increases the information’s
quality, relevance, and timeliness about the actor. The reason is that the central actors have
interaction with more actors increasing the information flow about the central actor.
Similarly, if the firm’s industry has many customer and supplier industries then the
information about the firm’s industry will be more widely known. We can argue that if the
firm belongs to a central industry then the information about this firm is also more likely to
be known than firms which belong to less central industries. Thus, the hypothesis follows:
H1: The announcement day abnormal returns to the acquirer which is more central in a
network is relatively more negative.
Now, let us apply the same set of arguments to the target. If more information is known
about the target, then the bargaining power of the target gets reduced resulting in the
acquirer obtaining a larger fraction of the synergy. Thus, the more information is known
about the target the higher is the announcement day stock returns for the acquirer.
Measuring the amount of information of non-publicly traded targets available to the
acquirer is difficult. So, the literature typically uses the size of the target as a proxy for
information. The reason is that if the firm is large it has more stakeholders and more
popular press articles leading to an increase in information of the firm. Another proxy is
whether the target is publicly traded or is privately held. If the target is privately held, then
there is less information available as these firms do not need to file annual reports to SEC
or disclose any information to the public.
An implication of the above arguments is that if more information is known about the
target and if the acquirer is more central, then the acquirer is more likely to obtain the
private information. Thus, the hypothesis follows:
H2: The announcement day abnormal returns to the acquirer which is more central in a
network increases if the target is public and is larger in size, conditioned on the negative
returns based on the acquirers central position in the network.
An alternate way to measure the information availability of the target is to consider the
industry’s network centrality. As before, we argue that if the target’s industry is more
central, then more information about the target is available to the acquirer. The above
arguments suggests that a smaller fraction of the synergy being obtained by the more
central target.
H3: The premium to a target which is less central in a network is higher than the premium
to a target that is more central in a network, all else equal.
A’hern (2012) hypothesizes that the division in gains in mergers depend on the cus-
tomer–supplier relations in the product market. Although A’hern (2012) and this paper
contribute to the same strand of research which explains merger returns based on bar-
gaining power (Boone and Mulherin 2006; Povel and Singh 2006); however there are a
number of important differences between both these papers. The theoretical underpinnings
for A’hern come from transaction cost economics. A’hern argues that a customer could be
dependent on a supplier because the supplier’s inputs are crucial to the customer. A’hern
links this dependence to bargaining power and states that firms that are more product-
market dependent on the other have a weaker bargaining position and so gain a smaller
fraction of the synergy.
Network centrality and mergers 397
123
Author's personal copy
Our hypotheses come from information economics and we argue that information per se
and not product market dependencies gives bargaining power to the firms involved in a
merger. For instance, if a target knows that it is valuable to the acquirer for a certain
strategic reason (e.g. entry into a new industry, customer base, production knowledge,
patents, etc.), then the target can use that information to extract a larger premium from the
acquirer. Note that none of the above examples necessitates a direct or potential customer–
supplier relationship as in A’hern (2012).
3 Data and variable construction
3.1 Centrality measures
A’hern (2012) uses the ratio of one industry’s inputs to another industry’s outputs to
measure firm level customer–supplier dependence. In this paper the focus is not on trading
relationships but on information flow. For instance, two firms may not be in industries that
have direct trading relationship, but may still have information about each other. Thus, the
measure used by A’hern (2012) is not appropriate in this research. Another issue with
interpreting the product market based A’hern measure as a proxy for information flow is
that two industries might have a weak customer supplier relationship but might still have a
significant amount of information about each other.
To overcome the challenge of having a proxy for the measure of information avail-
ability of a firm we proceed as follows. We assume that a channel of information flow is
between the customers and suppliers. Thus, one method is to trace the path of information
flow. In terms of graph theory, all the customer–supplier relationships are part of a large
network with each industry being a node. Some nodes in this network are more important
than others. Graph theory has put forward some network statistics (e.g. degree, closeness,
betweenness, etc.) to reflect the importance of these nodes in relation to other nodes which
are directly or indirectly connected through a number of intermediate industries. This
approach has the advantage that unlike A’hern (2012) two firms need not belong to
industries that have direct trading relationships. We only require that the two firms be part
of the broad inter-industry network. We are fortunate that all the industries are part of this
network and so are able to formulate our empirical strategy for testing our hypotheses
about information availability of a firm and the returns from mergers.
The building block of these centrality measures is the Benchmark Input–Output Use
Table provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.1 The Use Table is a matrix con-
taining the value of commodity flows between each pair of roughly 500 private-sector,
intermediate six-digit IO industries (see Lawson 1997) for detailed description of the
dataset). The benchmark tables are reported every 5 years (1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002).
The latest table available is that of 2002. The 2007 tables have not yet been published. The
table reports for each pair of industries, i and j, the value of i’s output required to produce
industry j’s total output (aij). Bureau of Economic Analysis publishes these benchmark
tables every 5 years and regularly modifies the industry classifications. Hence, a concor-
dance is hand constructed by going through each industry classification and then mapping
previous industry classifications to the current industry classifications. The next step is to
construct the standard centrality measure. The most commonly used centrality measure is
degree. Degree counts the number of ties the industry has with other industries. The rest of
1 The data can be freely downloaded from: http://www.bea.gov/industry/io_benchmark.htm.
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the centrality measures are defined in the ‘‘Appendix’’. In general, the weighted centrality
measures are more informative as they use all available information.
Table 1 panel A reports the median and the standard deviation of the of the centrality
measures. It seems that there is no time pattern for the changes in the centrality measures
that can be generalized to all (or most) of the centrality measures. This can be seen by
degree first decreasing and then increasing; while the weighted eigenvector centrality
measure increases over time. In unreported tables the statistical significance of these
changes were found to be insignificant. It seems that these centrality measures are stable in
the sense that there is no time pattern. The implication here is that the regression results
reported later in the paper are not likely to be driven by the time-trend in the centrality
measures.
Table 1 panel B reports the correlation between the different centrality measures. It
appears that degree and eigenvector are 95 % correlated. After that degree is 67 % cor-
related with closeness. Weighted eigenvector weighted is 90 % correlated with weighted
degree, and 80 % correlated with out-degree and in-degree. As expected most of these
measures are highly correlated suggesting that most of these centrality measures capture
some variations in the industry’s centrality.
3.2 Mergers and acquisitions data and centrality
The source of the mergers and acquisitions data is Security Data Corporation’s (SDC)
dataset. Here we apply the standard filters from the literature (see Moeller et al. 2004;
Baxamusa and Georgieva 2013):
• The announcement date is between 1980 and 2010;
• The acquirer controls less than 50 % of the shares of the target at the announcement
date and obtains 100 % of the target shares;
• The deal value exceeds or equals $1 million;
• The transaction size is more than 1 % of the value of the acquirer (and)
• The deal completion time is less than 1,000 days.
The observations in the sample without SIC codes were dropped. Additionally, obser-
vations with SIC codes that did not match SIC codes from in http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/
sicsearch.html were dropped (for example some observations had SIC code 2000; however
there is no such SIC code). This cleaning of data is important as the firm’s industries are
used to create a network of industries and the position of the industries in these networks is
taken as a proxy for the firm’s centrality. Additionally, the publicly traded firms should
have data in Compustat. The sample consists of 15,387 public traded acquirers and 2,234
acquisitions with both the acquirer and the target being publicly traded.
Table 2 panel A reports the centrality measures for the acquirer; while Table 2 panel B
reports the centrality measure for the target firms. In both panels A and B there is no
obvious time trend. This is consistent with the findings of Table 1 Panel A. In terms of
comparing panels A and B of Table 2, it seems that in columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) the
value of degree of the acquirer is larger than that of the target. However, for other measures
of centrality no clear time pattern exists for the relationship between the centrality of the
target and the centrality of the acquirer.
Table 3 panel A and panel B report the summary statistics of some of the key variables.
The first few rows report the key summary statistics of centrality measures. Unlike Table 2
these measures are pooled across the years and do not show the time series patterns. The
degree centrality measure for the acquirer as reported in Table 3 Panel A is 60.49 in
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of centrality measures
Centrality measures Statistic 80–84 85–89 90–94 95–99 00–10
No. of acquirers 1,105 1,230 2,343 5,317 5,392
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: acquirersa
Degree Median 72.13 43.01 31.57 54.89 59.04
SD 29.56 30.76 30.93 29.07 29.44
Eigenvector Median 11.65 8.02 7.14 9.59 7.92
SD 4.12 4.41 4.64 3.23 2.80
Closeness Median 44.05 38.55 36.74 76.15 70.94
SD 5.60 6.16 5.91 15.77 17.11
Betweenness Median 0.48 0.14 0.14 0.22 0.13
SD 0.41 0.39 0.46 1.04 0.28
Degree weighted Median 0.15 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.10
SD 0.29 0.25 0.29 0.31 0.24
Eigenvector weighted Median 3.23 1.92 3.68 2.26 4.71
SD 12.77 15.23 14.78 17.05 14.03
In-degree Median 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.06
SD 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.14
Out-degree Median 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03
SD 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.16
Centrality measures Statistic 80–84 85–89 90–94 95–99 00–10
No. of targets 149 237 265 811 772
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel B: targetsb
Degree Median 44.54 38.98 47.73 42.82 63.86
SD 27.94 30.71 31.73 29.13 30.62
Eigenvector Median 7.31 7.43 9.22 9.25 8.20
SD 3.95 4.39 4.61 3.30 2.92
Closeness Median 37.46 37.39 39.05 75.26 73.45
SD 5.39 6.20 6.01 15.72 17.67
Betweenness Median 0.06 0.08 0.34 0.22 0.18
SD 0.61 0.38 0.50 0.97 0.28
Degree weighted Median 0.09 0.06 0.21 0.05 0.11
SD 0.35 0.25 0.29 0.25 0.23
Eigenvector weighted Median 1.29 1.73 9.74 2.04 4.82
SD 16.40 15.37 13.45 14.94 13.44
In-degree Median 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.06
SD 0.22 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.12
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column (1) while the centrality measure for the target variable in panel B is 58.69. The
difference between these two means is not statistically significant. This lack of statistical
significance between the means of the acquirer and the target variables is true for all the
centrality measures and is consistent with the implications of Table 2.
3.3 Other variables
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of other variables used in the analysis. Panel A
reports that the announcement day abnormal returns for the acquirer are positive. This is
consistent with the findings of Moeller et al. (2004). The acquirers in the sample have a
mean Tobin’s Q of 2.319 and an average leverage ratio of about 19 %. For the public
acquirer the about 18.9 % of the deals are fully financed with the acquirers stock, and 63 %
of the acquirers tend to be in high tech industries.
Table 3 panel b reports that the average target has a Tobin’s Q of 2.06 and has an
average leverage of about 16.7 %. The 38.26 % of the acquisitions between publicly traded
acquires and publicly traded targets are fully financed with the acquirer’s stock; while
24.38 % of such transactions are fully financed by cash. The target receives a 22.29 %
mark-up above its announcement day stock price and the markup including the run-up of
the stock is 33.57 %.
4 Results
4.1 Empirical model
The hypothesis are empirically tested using the following model:
Returnsi ¼ a þ b1 Weighted Centrali þ b2Xi þ ei. . . ð1Þ
We follow Masulis et al. (2007) for the empirical model. This is a good model as it controls
for most of the known sources of abnormal returns. The literature documents that the
returns to the acquirer comes from three sources. These sources are the firm characteristics,
the bid characteristics and industry characteristics. These sources are part of the control
Table 2 continued
Centrality measures Statistic 80–84 85–89 90–94 95–99 00–10
No. of targets 149 237 265 811 772
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Out-degree Median 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.05
SD 0.24 0.15 0.20 0.16 0.17
a The table reports the median and the standard deviation of the centrality measures. The reported data is for
the industry’s of the acquirer firms. The data of the different years in the Input–Output tables are from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis. Based on concordance table the I–O data is reflects the 2002 I–O classifi-
cations. The results are reported on an industry basis
b The table reports the median and the standard deviation of the centrality measures. The reported data is for
the industry’s of the target firms. The data of the different years in the Input–Output tables are from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis. Based on concordance table the I–O data is reflects the 2002 I–O classifi-
cations. The results are reported on an industry basis
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Table 3 Summary statistics
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: acquirer variablesa
Centrality
Degree 60.4999 63.8550 31.0443 0.2530 100.0001
Eigenvector 8.7306 9.4150 3.4828 0.0220 13.9630
Closeness 68.0155 62.5900 22.8070 25.8690 100.0001
Betweenness 0.3997 0.2500 0.6082 0.0001 10.3710
Degree weighted 0.2690 0.1000 0.3152 0.0001 1.3220
Eigenvector weighted 14.5754 4.7100 18.2656 0.0001 81.3010
In-degree 0.1315 0.0580 0.1570 0.0001 0.7750
Out-degree 0.1694 0.0450 0.2311 0.0001 1.0370
Returns
3-day abnormal returns 0.0103 0.0034 0.0819 -0.6990 1.5186
5-day abnormal returns 0.0115 0.0039 0.0955 -0.6804 1.6448
Firm characteristics
Tobin’s Q 2.3199 1.4625 6.4566 0.1135 548.1840
Cash Flow 0.0908 0.1461 3.5119 -380.3913 1.2706
Leverage 0.1917 0.1284 0.2243 0.0001 6.8794
Size 3,616.2340 290.2230 28,170.0200 0.0010 129,180.0000
Bid characteristics
Deal size 0.4766 0.0855 16.2619 0.0110 1994.9170
All equity 0.1890 0.0001 0.3915 0.0001 1.0000
All cash 0.2275 0.0001 0.4192 0.0001 1.0000
Conglomerate 0.3395 0.0001 0.4735 0.0001 1.0000
High tech 0.6336 1.000 0.4819 0.000 1.000
Ln(Transaction value) 3.7134 3.5729 1.8015 0.2263 11.3983
Industry
Product market competition 0.1965 0.1244 0.2206 0.0001 1.0000
Tobin’s Q 1.5549 1.3398 2.8558 0.4337 281.2500
Cash flow 0.0924 0.1028 0.2320 -8.6630 1.0023
Leverage 0.1206 0.0637 0.1562 0.0001 8.3941
Size 683.4105 72.0460 2,961.4940 0.3120 94,175.0400
Panel B: target variablesb
Centrality
Degree 58.6933 57.7590 31.3610 0.0001 100.0001
Eigenvector 8.6661 9.4150 3.5257 0.0001 13.9630
Closeness 67.4223 61.7560 22.9182 26.5950 100.0001
Betweenness 0.3955 0.2200 0.5907 0.0001 5.8010
Degree weighted 0.2361 0.1000 0.2774 0.0001 1.3220
Eigenvector weighted 12.8036 4.2130 15.8277 0.0001 81.3010
In-degree 0.1213 0.0510 0.1478 0.0001 0.7750
Out-degree 0.1444 0.0450 0.1990 0.0001 1.0370
Returns
Premium 0.0018 0.0016 0.0011 0.0001 0.0192
Mark-up 0.2229 0.1826 0.3931 -3.1909 3.5836
404 M. Baxamusa et al.
123
Author's personal copy
Table 3 continued
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mark-up plus run-up 0.3357 0.2997 0.5877 -11.0309 4.1518
Firm characteristics
Tobin’s Q 2.0611 1.3957 2.3364 0.2783 38.0510
Cash flow 0.1460 0.1311 0.1866 -1.8241 1.2456
Leverage 0.1677 0.1211 0.1701 0.0001 1.2069
Size 9983.6810 1372.8150 43351.8500 0.1760 902,210.0001
Bid characteristics
Deal size 0.3564 0.1590 0.7699 0.0111 20.7644
All equity 0.3826 0.0001 0.4861 0.0001 1.0000
All cash 0.2438 0.0001 0.4295 0.0001 1.0000
Conglomerate 0.3609 0.0001 0.4804 0.0001 1.0000
High tech 0.6581 1.000 0.4744 0.0001 1.000
Industry
Product market competition 0.1778 0.1088 0.2132 0.0001 1.0000
Tobin’s Q 1.4258 1.2542 1.0101 0.2489 15.2872
Cash Flow 0.0730 0.0760 0.1966 -3.4089 0.7737
Leverage 0.1234 0.0584 0.9115 0.0001 46.8324
Size 646.8861 73.9515 3,234.5130 0.8470 82,195.7000
a The total number of observations are 15378. The sample period is 1980–2010. The sample is the overlap between
the data from SDC and Compustat. Only, the observations for the acquirer are reported in this panel. Mean is the
sample average, the median is the sample’s median value, SD is the standard deviation of the sample, Min is the
minimum value of the observation in the sample, Max is the maximum value of the observations in the sample. The
returns are calculated using the market model. The estimation window starts 30 days before the event and consists
of 150 trading days. The event window is 3 days around the announcement day, and 5 days about the
announcement date. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of the firms assets (market capitalization plus total
liability) divided by the total assets of the firm. Cash flows is EBITDA/total assets. Leverage is total liability
divided by total assets. Size is the total assets of the firm. Deal size is the ratio for the target’s total assets to the
acquirer’s total assets. All Equity and all cash are dummy variables that take the value of one if the acquisition is
fully paid with the acquirers stock or is in cash. Conglomerate is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the
acquisition leads to diversification. High tech is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the target belongs
to the technology industries as identified by SDC. Ln(Transaction value) is the log of the transaction value which is
supplied by SDC. Product market competition is the Herfidahl index of the industry. The mean industry values are
reported for the other industry measures
b The total number of observations are 2,234. The sample period is 1980–2010. The sample is the overlap between
the data from SDC and Compustat. Only, the observations for the target are reported in this panel. Mean is the
sample average, the median is the sample’s median value, SD is the standard deviation of the sample, Min is the
minimum value of the observation in the sample, Max is the maximum value of the observations in the sample.
Premium is the ratio of the transaction value to the value of the market value of the target. Mark-up is the 1 day
change in the target’s stock price about the announcement of the acquisition. Markup-plus run-up is the change in
the price of the target’s stock over a 1 month period before the announcement day in addition to the mark-up.
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of the firms assets (market capitalization plus total liability) divided by
the total assets of the firm. Cashflows is EBITDA/total assets. Leverage is total liability divided by total assets. Size
is the total assets of the firm. Deal size is the ratio for the target’s total assets to the acquirer’s total assets. All
Equity and all cash are dummy variables that take the value of one if the acquisition is fully paid with the acquirers
stock or is in cash. Conglomerate is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the acquisition leads to
diversification. High tech is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the target belongs to the technology
industries as identified by SDC. Ln(Transaction value) is the log of the transaction value which is supplied by SDC.
Product market competition is the Herfidahl index of the industry. The mean industry values are reported for the
other industry measures
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variables in the above model. In the above equation returns refers to the 3-day abnormal
announcement day returns for the acquirer. Weighted Central refers to the weighted
centrality of the acquirer. X represents an array of standard controls from the literature.
These controls are divided into three categories. The first category deals with firm char-
acteristics. These firm characteristics include growth (Tobin’s q), agency cost (cash flow),
financial constraint (leverage), and the size of the firm. The second category of controls
represents the characteristics of the deal. The deal characteristics that are controlled for are
the relative size of the deal, whether the mode of payments is cash or non-cash (Kohers
et al. 2007), if the deal is classified as hostile or neutral by SDC, and if the target is a
technology firm. The third category of controls represents industry characteristics. The
industry characteristics are the industry’s median Tobin’s Q, cash flows, and leverage.
Additionally, Fama and French’s 49 industry dummies and year dummies are employed
but not reported.
The empirical strategy is different than A’hern (2012). I use the industry’s centrality in a
network as a proxy for bargaining power (see also Aggarwal and Baxamusa 2013), while
A’hern (2012) uses customer–supplier relationships and firm characteristics like Market-
to-book and profitability as proxies for bargaining power. The issue with market-to-book is
that it represents an array of firm characteristics including stock market investor irratio-
nality. In addition to bargaining power, profitability also reflects the agency cost of free
cash flows.
4.2 Acquirer’s abnormal returns and centrality
In this sub-section we test the first hypothesis which is that the acquirer’s abnormal return
to the acquirer has a negative relationship to the acquirers’ centrality in the network. We
employ Eq. (1) to test the hypothesis. In Table 4 Eq. (1) is estimated but without any other
controls. Table 4 Panel (A) reports a negative relationship between 3-day Abnormal
returns and the measures of acquirer’s centrality in each of the four columns. These
estimates are statistically significant at the 1 % confidence level.
Panel (B) reports the relationship between 3-day abnormal returns and weighted cen-
trality measures. Closeness and betweenness cannot be calculated using the weights,
however directional measures like in-degree and out-degree can be calculated. Panel
(B) reports that the variables of interest in each of the four columns have a negative
relationship. This suggests that even with weighted centrality measures the acquirer returns
are negative. These results are consistent with the findings of Panel (A).
Panel (C) investigates whether the results reported in Table 4 panel (A) are robust to
using direct customer–supplier relationship as an additional control. To test it we add the
independent variable Acquirer Input/Target Output from A’hern (2012) to the centrality
measures used in panel (A). Panel (C) reports that the centrality measure in each of the four
columns retains its statistical significance while the customer–supplier relationship mea-
sured by Acquirer Input/Target Output is generally not statistically significant. The
implication here is that the relationship reported in panel (A) is robust to direct customer–
supplier relationship and so the relationship reported in this paper is different from those in
A’hern (2012).
The estimates reported in Table 4 do not use any controls, so one of the criticism can be
that these results are driven by other known causes. In Table 5 we mitigate this criticism by
including other controls from the literature. In terms of controls, the first set is firm
characteristics. The literature documents that the relationship between the acquirer’s
abnormal announcement day returns and the acquirer’s Tobin’s Q is negative. Lang et al.
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Table 4 Regression of abnormal returns to acquirer with no controls
3-day abnormal returns (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: symmetric non-weighted centrality measures as independent variablesa
Degree -0.0001
2.78**
Eigenvector -0.0006
3.10**
Closeness -0.0001
3.60**
Betweenness -0.0030
2.68**
Constant 0.0135 0.0159 0.0171 0.0119
9.69** 8.41** 8.77** 14.19**
Observations 15,378 15,378 15,378 15,378
R2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Panel B: weighted centrality measures as independent variablesb
Symmetric centrality
Degree weighted -0.0079
3.97**
Eigenvector weighted -0.0001
4.02**
Directed centrality
In-degree -0.0090
2.11*
Out-degree -0.0132
5.16**
13.44** 13.75** 12.51** 14.61**
Observations 15,378 15,378 15,378 15,378
R2 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
Panel C: Robustness to direct customer–supplier relationshipc
Degree -0.0001
2.24*
Eigenvector -0.0005
2.09*
Closeness -0.0001
2.76**
Betweenness -0.0015
2.88**
Acquirer input/target output -0.0726 -0.0241 -0.1185 -0.1326
1.23 0.94 2.29* 1.30
Constant 0.0156 0.0128 0.0160 0.0128
9.66** 3.44** 8.77** 13.31**
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(1989) suggest that the reason is that acquirers with poorer growth prospects (low Tobin’s
Q firms) are acquiring targets with better growth prospects. Jensen (1986) finds that firms
with higher amount of free cash flows have more shareholder-manager agency conflicts,
manifesting in value destroying acquisitions. Thus, we should expect a negative rela-
tionship between acquirer announcement day abnormal returns and acquirer cash flows.
Leverage is an important governance mechanism, as higher leverage imposes discipline on
the managers and reduces cash flows that the managers can use for agency motivated
acquisitions. Thus, we should expect a positive relationship between acquirer abnormal
returns and leverage. Moeller et al. (2004) document a negative relationship between
acquirer size and acquirer returns. One possible reason is that the size of the acquirer is a
deterrent to market discipline. Hence, we should expect a negative relationship between
acquirer returns and size.
The second set of controls is deal characteristics. Moeller et al. (2004) document a
positive relationship between abnormal returns and deal size. However, it should also be
pointed out that Moeller et al. find the reverse relationship in a sub-sample consisting of
very large deals. The literature has documented a negative relationship when the acqui-
sition is paid for in equity. The reason is that equity has an adverse selection problem.
Thus, we should expect a negative relationship between abnormal returns and equity. To
complete the set of controls we also include cash as an additional control. Moeller et al.
(2004) find a negative return if the firm acquires a public target the reason is that the
private firms command a liquidity premium. Thus, as in the prior literature we add two
additional controls public and subsidiary. If two firms which do not belong to the same
industry merge then the combined firm becomes a conglomerate. We add a dummy for
these types of acquisitions. Recent literature has pointed out that conglomerate acquisitions
need not be value destroying thus we expect a positive sign for the estimate. Hence, we
create a binary variable for high tech which takes the value of one if both the acquirer and
the target are in high technology industries. We expect a positive relationship as the human
capital and technology gains may emerge from the acquisition.
Table 5 panel (A) reports a negative relationship of acquirer abnormal return about the
announcement of the acquisition. These results are consistent with the findings of Table 4
Panel (A). Similarly, Table 5 Panel (B) reports the results of acquirer announcement day
Table 4 continued
3-day abnormal returns (1) (2) (3) (4)
Observations 15,378 15,378 15,378 15,378
R2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
a This table reports the relationship between acquirers abnormal returns and the acquirers non-weighted
centrality measures. OLS regression methodology is used with clustered standard errors. The variables are
defined in previous tables. The standard errors are clustered at the industry level (Fama–French 49 indus-
tries). **, * represents statistical significance at the 1 and 5 % level respectively
b This table reports the relationship between acquirers abnormal returns and the acquirers weighted cen-
trality measures. OLS regression methodology is used with clustered standard errors. The variables are
defined in previous tables. The standard errors are clustered at the industry level (Fama–French 49 indus-
tries). **, * represents statistical significance at the 1 and 5 % level respectively
c This table reports the relationship between acquirers abnormal returns and the acquirers non-weighted
centrality measures. OLS regression methodology is used with clustered standard errors. The variables are
defined in previous tables. The standard errors are clustered at the industry level (Fama–French 49 indus-
tries). **, * represents statistical significance at the 1 and 5 % level respectively
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Table 5 Regression of abnormal returns to acquirer with controls
3-day abnormal returns (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: symmetric non-weighted centrality measures as independent variablesa
Centrality
Degree -0.0001
2.09*
Eigenvector -0.0006
2.79**
Closeness -0.0002
3.21**
Betweenness -0.0038
3.28**
Firm characteristics
Tobin’s Q -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008
2.42* 2.35* 2.37* 2.34*
Cash flows -0.0098 -0.0119 -0.0122 -0.0113
2.25* 2.64** 2.69** 2.53*
Leverage 0.0003 0.0007 0.0012 0.0008
0.07 0.19 0.34 0.22
Size -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
4.12** 3.75** 3.61** 3.85**
Deal characteristics
Deal size 0.0020 0.0054 0.0053 0.0054
1.86 2.03* 2.02* 2.04*
Tender 0.0123 0.0124 0.0123 0.0126
3.39** 3.28** 3.25** 3.33**
All equity -0.0030 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0010
1.37 0.36 0.41 0.39
All cash 0.0022 0.0030 0.0029 0.0029
1.54 2.03* 1.96* 1.98*
Friendly -0.0441 -0.0469 -0.0466 -0.0469
3.47** 3.52** 3.50** 3.51**
Hostile -0.0554 -0.0601 -0.0598 -0.0600
3.61** 3.77** 3.75** 3.76**
Public target -0.0252 -0.0271 -0.0271 -0.0270
13.91** 13.38** 13.36** 13.30**
Subsidiary target 0.0038 0.0035 0.0034 0.0038
2.50* 2.19* 2.16* 2.42*
Conglomerate 0.0008 0.0007 0.0006 0.0009
0.64 0.49 0.43 0.66
High tech -0.0010 0.0013 0.0015 0.0010
0.64 0.81 0.93 0.66
Industry
Product market competition 0.0008 -0.0032 -0.0030 -0.0037
0.25 0.98 0.93 1.12
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Table 5 continued
3-day abnormal returns (1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobin’s Q 0.0004 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009
1.25 2.16* 2.18* 2.20*
Cash flow -0.0004 -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0009
0.05 0.14 0.10 0.13
Leverage 0.0030 0.0002 0.0006 0.0006
0.77 0.06 0.17 0.15
Size 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
0.25 0.33 0.28 0.20
Constant 0.0663 0.0664 0.0671 0.0625
3.60** 3.50** 3.54** 3.32**
Observations 15,378 15,378 15,378 15,378
R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Panel B: weighted centrality measures as independent variablesb
Symmetric centrality
Degree weighted -0.0109
4.63**
Eigenvector weighted -0.0002
5.29**
Directed centrality
In-degree -0.0107
2.26*
Out-degree -0.0183
5.86**
Firm characteristics
Tobin’s Q -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008
2.45* 2.46* 2.36* 2.47*
Cash flows -0.0131 -0.0134 -0.0119 -0.0137
2.88** 2.93** 2.64** 3.00**
Leverage 0.0023 0.0033 0.0009 0.0033
0.68 0.95 0.26 0.96
Size -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
3.81** 3.75** 3.86** 3.78**
Deal characteristics
Deal size 0.0053 0.0053 0.0054 0.0053
2.02* 2.02* 2.03* 2.02*
Tender 0.0123 0.0124 0.0127 0.0120
3.26** 3.29** 3.36** 3.19**
All equity -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0012
0.45 0.49 0.42 0.48
All cash 0.0027 0.0026 0.0030 0.0026
1.85 1.78 2.03* 1.73
Friendly -0.0465 -0.0465 -0.0467 -0.0466
3.49** 3.48** 3.48** 3.50**
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abnormal returns and the weighted centrality measures. The estimates of the variables of
interest are negative and statistically significant at the 5 % confidence interval. These results
are also consistent with the findings of Table 4 Panel (B). Thus, Table 5 results are consistent
with those of Table 4 and show the robustness of the results to inclusion of controls.
In terms of other variables reported in Table 5, we find that the acquirer returns are
negatively correlated with the Acquirers’ Tobin Q, cash flows and size. The reason seems
to be that high growth firms measured by higher Tobin’s Q usually use more stocks in their
payment and so result in lower Tobin’s Q. if the acquirer has poor cash flows and so is
Table 5 continued
3-day abnormal returns (1) (2) (3) (4)
Hostile -0.0594 -0.0594 -0.0594 -0.0598
3.72** 3.72** 3.72** 3.75**
Public target -0.0270 -0.0271 -0.0271 -0.0270
13.36** 13.37** 13.40** 13.34**
Subsidiary target 0.0035 0.0036 0.0036 0.0034
2.20* 2.26* 2.25* 2.16*
Conglomerate 0.0008 0.0009 0.0007 0.0007
0.58 0.66 0.50 0.54
High tech 0.0026 0.0027 0.0010 0.0031
1.57 1.67 0.62 1.89
Industry
Product market competition -0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0032 -0.0021
0.84 0.78 0.98 0.65
Tobin’s Q 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009
2.06* 2.10* 2.13* 2.06*
Cash flow -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0019
0.25 0.24 0.20 0.27
Leverage -0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0003
0.00 0.04 0.09 0.09
Size 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001
0.07 0.13 0.41 0.42
Constant 0.0625 0.0610 0.0627 0.0615
3.32** 3.24** 3.33** 3.26**
Observations 15,378 15,378 15,378 15,378
R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
a This table reports the relationship between acquirers abnormal returns and the acquirers non-weighted
centrality measures. OLS regression methodology is used with clustered standard errors. The variables are
defined in previous tables. The standard errors are clustered at the industry level. Fama–French 49 industries
are used. Year and industry dummies have been used but the coefficients are not reported. **, * represents
statistical significance at the 1 and 5 % level respectively
b This table reports the relationship between acquirers abnormal returns and the acquirers weighted cen-
trality measures. OLS regression methodology is used with clustered standard errors. The variables are
defined in previous tables. The standard errors are clustered at the industry level (Fama–French 49 indus-
tries). Year and industry dummies have been used but the coefficients are not reported. **, * represents
statistical significance at the 1 and 5 % level respectively
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Table 6 Regression of 5 day abnormal returns to acquirer with industry controls weighted centrality
measures
5-day abnormal returns (1) (2) (3) (4)
Symmetric centrality
Degree weighted -0.0199
3.21**
Eigenvector weighted -0.0002
2.47*
Directed centrality
In-degree -0.0272
2.43*
Out-degree -0.0230
2.93**
Firm characteristics
Tobin’s Q -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010
2.40* 2.38* 2.40* 2.39*
Cash flows -0.0179 -0.0178 -0.0179 -0.0178
2.91** 2.90** 2.90** 2.89**
Leverage 0.0036 0.0042 0.0030 0.0039
0.80 0.90 0.65 0.85
Size -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
3.13** 3.10** 3.18** 3.08**
Deal characteristics
Deal size 0.0058 0.0058 0.0058 0.0058
1.93 1.93 1.92 1.93
Tender 0.0124 0.0126 0.0124 0.0125
2.90** 2.96** 2.89** 2.93**
All equity 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007
0.21 0.20 0.21 0.22
All cash 0.0010 0.0010 0.0011 0.0010
0.57 0.57 0.64 0.56
Friendly -0.0510 -0.0510 -0.0510 -0.0511
3.76** 3.76** 3.77** 3.76**
Hostile -0.0679 -0.0680 -0.0678 -0.0681
4.14** 4.14** 4.13** 4.14**
Public target -0.0294 -0.0296 -0.0295 -0.0295
12.29** 12.34** 12.30** 12.31**
Subsidiary target 0.0024 0.0025 0.0024 0.0024
1.28 1.31 1.27 1.27
Conglomerate -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0002
0.14 0.15 0.28 0.10
High tech 0.0018 0.0017 0.0015 0.0020
0.63 0.59 0.54 0.69
Industry
Product market competition -0.0047 -0.0038 -0.0042 -0.0043
1.18 0.96 1.06 1.07
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more likely to have agency problems and so the negative relationship between cash flows
and abnormal returns. Acquisitions by younger firms also lead to negative abnormal returns
as these are more likely to be risky. The sign and the significance of the estimates of the
deal characteristics are also similar to those in the literature. For example, a hostile offer
leads to lower abnormal returns for the acquirer.
A robustness test for the above results is to use a different dependent variable. So,
instead of the 3 day—abnormal returns we sue the 5-day announcement day abnormal
returns. We replicate one of our panels Table 5b other panels have been replicated but not
reported. The results in Table 6 report that the estimated coefficient of 5-day abnormal
returns and weighted centrality measures is negative and statistically significant at the 5 %
confidence level. These results show that our estimates of the Table 5 panel (b) are robust
to changes in the event window.
Tables 4, 5 and 6 report a negative relationship between the acquirer’s announcement
day abnormal returns and the acquirer’s centrality measures. These results suggest that the
market believes that the acquisition by firms that are more central reduces the acquirers’
value. One reason for this value reduction is that the acquirer might be paying too much
premium. This maybe the case if the target is better informed about the acquirer than the
acquirer is about the target. This informational difference leads the target to get a better
deal from the acquirer.
4.3 Acquirers centrality and its interaction with information
In this section we investigate the returns to the acquirer if there is a difference in infor-
mation availability of the acquirer and the target. One way of investigating this would be to
include the distance between the centrality measures of the acquirer and the target.
However, the strand of the literature on horizontal acquisitions suggests that a significant
Table 6 continued
5-day abnormal returns (1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobin’s Q 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006
1.40 1.42 1.37 1.41
Cash flow -0.0041 -0.0039 -0.0043 -0.0039
0.62 0.60 0.66 0.59
Leverage -0.0068 -0.0065 -0.0071 -0.0067
1.54 1.46 1.62 1.52
Size 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
0.16 0.21 0.47 0.06
Constant 0.0646 0.0621 0.0642 0.0640
2.26* 2.17* 2.24* 2.24*
Observations 15,378 15,378 15,378 15,378
R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
This table reports the relationship between acquirers abnormal returns and the acquirers weighted centrality
measures. OLS regression methodology is used with clustered standard errors. The variables are defined in
previous tables. The standard errors are clustered at the industry level. Fama–French 49 industries are used.
Year and industry dummies have been used but the coefficients are not reported. **, * represents statistical
significance at the 1 and 5 % level respectively
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Table 7 Regression of 3 day abnormal returns to acquirer with proxies for information
3-day abnormal returns (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: public targetsa
Symmetric centrality
Degree weighted -0.0223
4.09**
Degree weighted* public target 0.0312
4.97**
Eigenvector weighted -0.0003
3.58**
Eigenvector weighted* public target 0.0005
4.33**
Directed centrality
In-degree -0.0327
3.24**
In-degree* public target 0.0537
4.69**
Out-degree -0.0257
3.81**
Out-degree* public target 0.0413
4.52**
Firm characteristics
Tobin’s Q -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008
2.39* 2.38* 2.41* 2.37*
Cash flows -0.0173 -0.0173 -0.0172 -0.0173
3.66** 3.66** 3.63** 3.65**
Leverage 0.0027 0.0030 0.0016 0.0030
0.68 0.74 0.40 0.76
Size -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
3.04** 3.02** 3.03** 2.98**
Deal characteristics
Deal size 0.0052 0.0052 0.0052 0.0052
1.98* 1.98* 1.98* 1.99*
Tender 0.0116 0.0113 0.0107 0.0119
3.06** 2.99** 2.83** 3.16**
All equity -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0008
0.31 0.34 0.31 0.32
All cash 0.0027 0.0028 0.0029 0.0027
1.84 1.88 1.93 1.82
Friendly -0.0455 -0.0454 -0.0459 -0.0453
3.54** 3.53** 3.59** 3.49**
Hostile -0.0583 -0.0580 -0.0589 -0.0579
3.78** 3.76** 3.83** 3.73**
Public target -0.0355 -0.0342 -0.0342 -0.0341
12.95** 12.79** 12.59** 13.20**
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Table 7 continued
3-day abnormal returns (1) (2) (3) (4)
Conglomerate 0.0008 0.0008 0.0006 0.0008
0.57 0.53 0.42 0.58
High tech 0.0025 0.0024 0.0023 0.0026
1.02 0.97 0.94 1.08
Industry
Product market competition -0.0019 -0.0014 -0.0019 -0.0014
0.54 0.40 0.54 0.42
Tobin’s Q 0.0009 0.0009 0.0008 0.0009
1.99* 1.99* 1.94 2.00*
Cash flow -0.0054 -0.0054 -0.0057 -0.0053
0.75 0.74 0.79 0.73
Leverage -0.0049 -0.0046 -0.0053 -0.0049
1.37 1.28 1.49 1.35
Size -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
0.47 0.42 0.23 0.48
Constant 0.0564 0.0545 0.0565 0.0557
2.39* 2.31* 2.38* 2.37*
Observations 15,378 15,378 15,378 15,378
R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Panel B: size of targets (natural log of transaction value)b
Symmetric centrality
Degree weighted -0.0348
4.73**
Degree weighted* size of target 0.0051
3.72**
Eigenvector weighted -0.0006
4.83**
Eigenvector weighted* size of target 0.0001
4.11**
Directed centrality
In-degree -0.0573
3.95**
In-degree* size of target 0.0097
3.46**
Out-degree -0.0419
4.43**
Out-degree* size of target 0.0061
3.50**
Firm characteristics
Tobin’s Q -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007
1.98* 1.97* 1.98* 2.00*
Cash flows -0.0152 -0.0152 -0.0152 -0.0153
3.20** 3.20** 3.18** 3.21**
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Table 7 continued
3-day abnormal returns (1) (2) (3) (4)
Leverage 0.0026 0.0032 0.0022 0.0028
0.67 0.81 0.56 0.72
Size -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
1.77 1.83 1.79 1.58
Deal characteristics
Size of target -0.0030 -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0027
4.32** 4.40** 4.26** 4.19**
Deal size 0.0053 0.0054 0.0054 0.0054
2.01* 2.01* 2.01* 2.02*
Tender 0.0107 0.0110 0.0105 0.0108
2.86** 2.93** 2.82** 2.89**
All equity -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002
0.05 0.07 0.04 0.07
All cash 0.0027 0.0027 0.0028 0.0027
1.81 1.80 1.83 1.77
Friendly -0.0457 -0.0458 -0.0457 -0.0459
3.57** 3.58** 3.59** 3.56**
Hostile -0.0562 -0.0562 -0.0565 -0.0560
3.67** 3.68** 3.71** 3.64**
Public target -0.0227 -0.0228 -0.0229 -0.0227
10.78** 10.81** 10.83** 10.77**
Segment target 0.0037 0.0038 0.0037 0.0037
2.26* 2.30* 2.27* 2.27*
Conglomerate 0.0008 0.0008 0.0006 0.0009
0.54 0.57 0.41 0.60
High tech 0.0022 0.0020 0.0021 0.0023
0.89 0.83 0.85 0.94
Industry
Product market competition -0.0024 -0.0017 -0.0020 -0.0020
0.68 0.49 0.59 0.59
Tobin’s Q 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009
2.00* 2.02* 2.00* 2.00*
Cash flow -0.0054 -0.0053 -0.0054 -0.0052
0.75 0.73 0.76 0.72
Leverage -0.0050 -0.0045 -0.0053 -0.0049
1.38 1.23 1.47 1.33
Size -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
0.18 0.19 0.08 0.15
Constant 0.0642 0.0620 0.0633 0.0632
2.73** 2.63** 2.70** 2.69**
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number of these acquisitions should be in the same industry. Now, the centrality measures
used in this research are those of the industry, thus using the centrality measures of the
target and the acquirer will not disentangle these effects as both the acquirer and the target
will have the same centrality measure.
To resolve this empirical issue, we looked at the data available in SDC. SDC in general
classifies almost all the targets as public or private. From this research’s point of view this
classification is beneficial as public targets tend to have far more information flow avail-
able than private targets. Another variable that is available for almost all the targets is the
transaction value. Here the implication for our research is that targets that are larger will
have more information available than smaller targets. We exploit this data availability in
hypothesis (2).
We test hypothesis (2) by using equation (1) but augmenting it with an interaction term
between centrality and the information availability of the target. Table 7 panel (a) interacts
the centrality measure with the public status of the target; while panel (b) interacts the
centrality measure with the size of the target.
The results reported in Table 7 panel (a) report that the estimates of 3-day abnormal
returns and weighted centrality measure are negative and statistically significant at the once
percent confidence level. These results are consistent with findings of Table 5b. The
interaction term of weighted centrality and Public Target is positive and statistically sig-
nificant at the 1 % confidence interval. This result suggests that the announcement day
abnormal returns increases for the acquirer if the target is publicly traded and is relative to
the acquirer’s centrality measure. The sign and the statistical significance of the other
variables are similar to those reported in Table 5b.
Table 7 panel (b) reports the estimates of the acquirer abnormal returns and inter-
action term of the weighted centrality measure of the acquirer and the size of the
target. The estimates of the interaction term are positive and statistically significant at
the 1 % confidence interval. These results are consistent with the findings of the
Table 7a.
The implication of these results is as follows. The positive estimate suggests that as the
weighted degree of the acquirer increases and the size of the target (or the target’s public
status) increases, then the acquirer’s abnormal returns increases. This provides support for
the second hypothesis that the abnormal returns to the acquirer which is more central in a
network increases if the target is public and is larger in size.
Table 7 continued
3-day abnormal returns (1) (2) (3) (4)
Observations 15,378 15,378 15,378 15,378
R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
a This table reports the relationship between acquirers abnormal returns and the acquirers weighted cen-
trality measures. OLS regression methodology is used with clustered standard errors. The variables are
defined in previous tables. The standard errors are clustered at the industry level. Fama–French 49 industries
are used. Year and industry dummies have been used but the coefficients are not reported. **, * represents
statistical significance at the 1 and 5 % level respectively
b This table reports the relationship between acquirers abnormal returns and the acquirers weighted cen-
trality measures. OLS regression methodology is used with clustered standard errors. The variables are
defined in previous tables. The standard errors are clustered at the industry level. Fama–French 49 industries
are used. Year and industry dummies have been used but the coefficients are not reported. **, * represents
statistical significance at the 1 and 5 % level respectively
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Table 8 Regression of target stock premium and target weighted centrality measures
Markup ? runup (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: stock market premiuma
Symmetric centrality
Degree weighted -0.1153
2.62**
Eigenvector weighted -0.0023
3.27**
Directed centrality
In-degree -0.0578
1.98*
Out-degree -0.1880
2.94**
Firm characteristics
Tobin’s Q -0.0177 -0.0168 -0.0183 -0.0168
4.03** 4.21** 4.08** 3.56**
Cash flows 0.0969 0.1044 0.0878 0.0862
1.72 2.01* 1.48 1.39
Leverage -0.0851 -0.0702 -0.1025 -0.0741
1.36 1.22 1.58 1.09
Size -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
0.17 0.33 0.19 0.27
Deal characteristics
Deal size -0.0263 -0.0248 -0.0254 -0.0270
2.12* 2.19* 1.97* 2.02*
Tender 0.0853 0.0957 0.0972 0.0884
2.88** 3.57** 3.19** 2.77**
All equity -0.0041 0.0070 -0.0027 0.0060
0.19 0.35 0.12 0.25
All cash 0.0058 0.0066 -0.0016 0.0072
0.22 0.28 0.06 0.25
Friendly 0.0205 0.0166 0.0165 0.0195
0.70 0.63 0.55 0.62
Hostile 0.1796 0.1723 0.2282 0.1790
1.91 2.02* 2.30* 1.78
Public target 0.2825 0.2849 0.3396 0.2782
2.53* 2.81** 2.91** 2.33*
Subsidiary target 0.0314 0.0252 0.0189 0.0051
0.33 0.29 0.19 0.05
Conglomerate 0.0284 0.0179 0.0045 -0.0198
0.25 0.18 0.04 0.16
High tech -0.0368 -0.0241 -0.0536 -0.0227
1.39 1.00 2.00* 0.80
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Table 8 continued
Markup ? runup (1) (2) (3) (4)
Industry
Product market competition 0.0785 0.0987 0.1067 0.0946
1.54 2.15* 2.04* 1.74
Tobin’s Q 0.0094 0.0095 0.0112 0.0124
0.78 0.89 0.90 0.99
Cash flow 0.0055 -0.0118 0.0118 0.0063
0.10 0.24 0.21 0.11
Leverage -0.0188 -0.0198 -0.0194 -0.0191
6.05** 7.04** 6.03** 5.65**
Size -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
1.33 1.63 1.51 1.85
Constant 0.2501 0.2470 0.1911 0.2552
1.44 1.56 1.05 1.36
Observations 2,234 2,234 2,234 2,234
R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Premium (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B: valuation premiumb
Symmetric centrality
Degree weighted -0.0001
2.23*
Eigenvector weighted -0.0001
2.73**
Directed centrality
In-degree -0.0001
2.09*
Out-degree -0.0002
2.99**
Firm characteristics
Tobin’s Q -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
0.97 0.66 0.84 0.79
Cash flows 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
3.86** 3.35** 3.58** 4.51**
Leverage 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
2.25* 2.18* 1.73 2.79**
Size -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
0.52 0.42 0.45 0.60
Deal characteristics
Deal size 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
0.88 0.69 0.83 0.85
Tender 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
4.75** 3.52** 4.11** 5.18**
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4.4 Target’s premium and centrality
In this sub-section we test the third hypothesis which is that the less central target will
receive a larger premium after controlling for other factors. To test the third hypothesis we
Table 8 continued
Premium (1) (2) (3) (4)
All equity 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
0.31 0.17 0.12 0.17
All cash -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003
9.08** 7.35** 7.91** 10.39**
Friendly -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
6.96** 5.42** 5.92** 7.81**
Hostile 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
3.91** 2.95** 3.35** 4.07**
Public target 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003
2.81** 2.15* 2.64** 2.89**
Subsidiary target 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
0.22 0.00 0.20 0.35
Conglomerate 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
0.25 0.03 0.07 0.15
High tech -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
1.80 1.17 1.79 1.71
Industry
Product market competition 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
0.06 0.14 0.08 0.00
Tobin’s Q -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
0.72 0.38 0.13 0.62
Cash flow 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
0.16 0.02 0.03 0.16
Leverage -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
3.25** 2.49* 2.79** 3.69**
Size -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
1.65 1.02 1.31 2.03*
Constant 0.0015 0.0016 0.0015 0.0015
8.46** 7.29** 7.45** 9.52**
Observations 2,234 2,234 2,234 2,234
R2 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06
a Target variables are used. OLS regression methodology is used with clustered standard errors. The
variables are defined in previous tables. The standard errors are clustered at the industry level. Fama–French
49 industries are used. Year and industry dummies have been used but the coefficients are not reported. **, *
represents statistical significance at the 1 and 5 % level respectively
b Target premium and the target’s weighted centrality measures are used. OLS regression methodology is
used with clustered standard errors. The variables are defined in previous tables. The standard errors are
clustered at the industry level. Fama–French 49 industries are used. Year and industry dummies have been
used but the coefficients are not reported. **, * represents statistical significance at the 1 and 5 % level
respectively
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use Eq. (1) instead of using the acquirer values we now use the target values. So, the
dependent variable is target premium, and the weighted centrality measures are those of the
target.
Table 8 panel (a) reports the estimates of the stock market based premium and the
weighted centrality of the target. The estimated coefficient of weighted centrality measures
is negative and statistically significant at the 5 % confidence level. Table 8 panel
(b) reports the estimates of valuation based premiums and the centrality measure of the
target. The reported estimates for the target’s weighted centrality are negative and statis-
tically significant at the 5 % confidence interval. These results suggest that as the weighted
centrality of the target increases the premium (both stock and valuation) decreases. These
results suggest that targets that are more central receive lower premiums. Thus, the findings
in this tables support the third hypothesis.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the relationship between the weighted centrality of acquirers and
the returns from the acquisitions. We hypothesize that the more central the firm is the more
information is available about the firm, thus giving the other party additional power in
bargaining. This bargaining power translates into superior announcement day returns. We
use the industry’s centrality measure to proxy for the firm’s centrality in the network.
These measures of centrality include degree, eigenvector, closeness, and betweenness. We
find that the abnormal return to the acquirer as measured by the announcement abnormal
returns decreases as the acquirer’s centrality in the network increases. We also find that the
target’s premium decreases if it is more central in the network. Finally, we find that the
interaction term of the acquirers’ centrality and the public status of the target are positive.
We interpret this finding to suggest that the central acquirer benefits if it receives more
information about the target. We subject the results to a number of robustness tests. These
include using directed measures of centrality like in-degree and out-degree. We also use
different dependent variables like 3- and 5-days abnormal returns.
We contribute to the growing literature that documents the network centrality and
corporate decisions. The literature has studied the impact of the network centrality of the
board of directors and CEOs on corporate decisions. We add to that literature by inves-
tigating the relationship between customer–supplier network centrality and mergers. We
also contribute to the literature that studies the relationship between information and firm
value. Here we use the network centrality of the firm as a proxy for information avail-
ability. To the best of our knowledge, this is a unique application of the customer–supplier
network. In terms of future research, an extension of the paper is to study the choice
between cash and stocks used to pay the target when the acquirer is more central.
Appendix
Centrality Measures (Definitions are based on network theory).
Degree Defined as the number of industries the nodal industry has supplier or customer
relationships.
Eigenvector Each node in the industry network is assigned eigen values. Is the sum of
the eigenvalues of the connections of the industry.
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Closeness The farness of an industry is the sum of the shortest distance between the
industry and all other connected industries. The inverse of farness is closeness. Cannot be
calculated as a weighted centrality measure.
Betweenness Is the number of times the industry acts as the shortest path between two
other industries. Cannot be calculated as a weighted centrality measure.
Degree Weighted Defined as the number of industries the nodal industry has supplier or
customer relationships. Additionally, the number of ties is weighted by the total dollar flow
between the two industries.
Eigenvector Each node in the industry network is assigned eigen values. Is the sum of
the eigenvalues of the connections of the industry. Additionally, the number of ties is
weighted by the total dollar flow between the two industries.
In-degree Is the fraction of the number of industries supplying to the nodal industry.
Out-degree Is the fraction of industries that are customers of the nodal industry.
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